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QUASI-SET THEORY FOR BOSONS AND FERMIONS:
QUANTUM DISTRIBUTIONS
D. Krause∗, A. S. Sant’Anna∗ and
A. G. Volkov∗
Quasi-set theory provides a mathematical background for deal-
ing with collections of indistinguishable elementary particles. In
this paper, we show how to obtain the quantum statistics into
the scope of quasi-set theory and discuss the Helium atom, which
represents the simplest example where indistinguishability plays
an important role. A brief discussion about indistinguishabil-
ity and interference is also presented as well as other related
lines of work. One of the advantages of our approach is that
one of the most basic principles of quantum theory, namely,
the Indistinguishability Postulate, does not need to be assumed
even implicitely in the axiomatic basis of quantum mechanics.
1. INTRODUCTION
The present paper has a philosophical purpose in the sense that it copes with
philosophical questions regarding the foundations of quantum physics. On the
other hand, it is also a work on mathematical physics, in the sense that we are
concerned with the mathematical foundations of quantum physics. Mathematical
physics should not be understood as regarding the study of mathematical tech-
niques in theoretical physics only, but also as a discipline engaged in the mathe-
matical foundations of physical theories. It is in this ‘foundational’ sense that we
are here studying some problems about the concepts of identity and individuality
of the basic entities of quantum theory.
It is well known that both classical and quantum particles which share the same
set of intrinsic, state-independent properties like charge, rest-mass, etc., are indis-
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tinguishable.1 Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference in the behaviour of
the ensembles of such particles, as characterized by classical and quantum statis-
tics respectively. In classical mechanics, Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics counts as
distinct from the original one any arrangement obtained from a permutation of
particles between states, contrarily to Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac statistics,
as it is well known. Then, it has been argued that classical particles are ‘individ-
uals’ of some kind and, since they are indistinguishable in the sense mentioned
above, their individuality must be ascribed by something which ‘transcends’ their
properties; this idea has been discussed in (Krause and French, 1995; Post, 1963;
Redhead and Teller, 1991; Redhead and Teller, 1992; Teller, 1995). In quantum
statistics, on the other hand, the Indistinguishability Postulate asserts that “If a
permutation is applied to any state for an assembly of particles, then there is no
way of distinguishing the resulting permuted state function from the original one
by means of any observation at any time” (French, Krause and Maidens, 1997).
The Indistinguishability Postulate (henceforth ‘IP’) is one of the most basic prin-
ciples of quantum theory and implies that permutations of quantum particles are
not regarded as observable (Greenberg and Messiah, 1964).
Usually, IP has been interpreted according to two basic ways: the first one
assumes that IP implies that quantum particles cannot be regarded as ‘individu-
als’, since an ‘individual’ should be something having properties similar to those
of usual (macroscopic) bodies.2 This interpretation is closely related to what is
assumed in the context of quantum field theory, since, roughly speaking, quantum
field theories do not deal with ‘individuals’ (cf. the above references). The second
way in considering quantum particles regards them as individuals in a sense, and
the non-classical counting of quantum statistics are then understood as resulting
from the restrictions imposed to the set of the possible states acessible to the par-
ticles (French, 1989; French and Redhead, 1988; Redhead and Teller, 1992). In
short, only symmetrical and antisymmetical states are available, and the initially
attached individuality of particles is then ‘veiled’ by such a criterion.
Both alternatives mentioned above, albeit used in current literature, present
problems from the ‘foundational’ point of view. There is some obscurity lurking
in the concept of individuality in quantum physics. The idea of considering ‘non-
individuals’ seems strong,3 and in general one prefers to use another metaphysical
package, namely, that the quantum objects are individuals of a sort, despite quite
distinct from the usual objects described by classical mechanics. The just men-
tioned papers provide a wider discussion on this topic, so we shall not recall all
details here. We only remark that in the foundational studies on quantum the-
ory, it is usual to consider questions of interpretation of the formalism instead of
analysing the possibility of exchanging the underlying logico-mathematical appa-
ratus (as observed in (Faris, 1996)). We prefer to follow this second approach.
Thus, the present paper is the first one of a series devoted to such an exchanging
1We use the philosophical jargon in saying that ‘indistinguishable’ objects are objects that
share their properties, while ‘identical’ objects are ‘the very same object’. See (Krause and
French, 1995).
2The concept of a ‘physical object’ is difficult and controversial (Auyang, 1995; Castellani,
1997; Toraldo di Francia, 1978). In the papers by Redhead and Teller mentioned above there
are additional discussions on this point.
3But in (Krause and French, 1995) it was outlined a ‘rationale’ for such a view.
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of the mathematical framework of quantum theory. Although our attention in
this paper is devoted mainly to quantum statistics, we recognize that there are
other quantum phenomena where indistinguishability plays a fundamental role.
But such questions will be discussed only in future papers.
In a previous work, two of us have presented a manner to cope with collections
of ‘physically’ indistinguishable particles in a set-theoretical framework (that is,
we have worked in standard set theory) by using hidden variables (Sant’Anna and
Krause, 1997). Here, we use an alternative package, namely, quasi-set theory, to
provide an adequate way to express the quantum statistics; it results that there
is no necessity of the assumptiom that only ‘symmetrical’ and ‘antisymmetrical’
states are available (as implied by IP). This fact results as a natural consequence
of our mathematical framework.
In the next section, we recall the main features of a quasi-set theory. For the
moment, let us say that by using quasi-set theory, we are not commited to the as-
sumption that quantum particles are, at least in principle, individuatable4 objetcs
whose indistinguishability is ascribed only a posteriori by choosing the symmetric
(and antisymmetric) vectors or, alternatively, the symmetric (and antisymmet-
ric) solutions of the Schro¨dinger equation. Let us remark that by using classical
mathematics (built on, say, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory) to found quantum the-
ory, we are necessarily commited in considering the basic entities as provided of
individuality of some kind. In short, this is due to the fact that every entity is, at
the end of the road, a set, and a set is, according to Cantor (1955), “a collection
into a whole of distinct objects of our intuition or of our thought” (our emphasis).
Some authors like Weyl expressed the calculation with ‘aggregates’ so that
the assumptions of quantum theory could be reached in a satisfactory way; but
the only ‘objective’ result of Weyl’s efforts was to find an alternative manner to
express the very same procedure physicists implicitely use, namely, the assumption
that we have a set S of (hence, distinguishable) objects (say, n objects) endowed
with an equivalence relation ∼. Then the ‘desired result’, according to Weyl
(1949), is to obtain the ordered decomposition n = n1+ . . .+nk, where ni are the
cardinalities of the equivalence classes Ci, i = 1, . . . , k of the quotient set S/ ∼.
But, as it is easy to note, this procedure ‘veils’ the very nature of the elements of
the set S, that is, veils the fact that they are individuatable objects since they are
members of a set .5 We would like to emphasize that there is no scape. Classical
logic and mathematics are commited with a conception of identity which does not
make any distinction between identity and indistinguishability: indistinguishable
things are the very same thing and conversely.
By using quasi-set theory instead of standard set theory, our paper provides
a way of obtaining the statistics in the direction traced by Post’s (1963) sugges-
tion that the ‘non-individuality’ of quantum objects should be ascribed “right at
the start”; that is, contrarily to Weyl and the standard presentation of quantum
theory, we keep them as objects devoided of identity just from the beginning. By
this way, we invert the usual order of considering quantum entities; the indistin-
4This term was coined by Redhead and Teller [op. cit.] to mean those entites which can be
individualized by some device.
5One of us have analysed Weyl’s ideas in connection with quasi-set theory; see (Krause,
1991).
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guishability among certain quantum objects is assumed as a primitive concept.
The tools for considering that indistinguishability does not imply identity is pro-
vided by quasi-set theory. We also discuss the problem of the Helium atom, where
indistinguishability should be assumed in order to define the wave function of such
an atom.
1.1 SOME RELATED TOPICS
There are of course several questions to be answered in connection with the
discussion presented here. Let us give an idea of some of them, which despite
their importance, will not be pursued in this paper.
The first problem concerns the nature of the ‘properties’ to be considered
as licit properties of quantum objects. The question is subtle, and it is related
with the concept of indistinguishability as presented above, for if indistinguish-
able particles are to be considered as those particles that share the same set of
properties (of some kind), it seems clear that a reasonable definition of what is to
be understood by a property should be provided. Some authors have mentioned
the necessity of restricting the collection of properties to certain particular cases.
Nevertheless, whatever definition we consider, it seems that there are only ad hoc
reasons in the tentatives to dismiss some possible attribute of a thing as a legit-
ime property of that thing, and the same happens in particular if the ‘thing’ is
an elementary particle. Let us be more precise on this point. When we consider
Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (henceforth ‘PII’), which in a
second order language with identity may be formulated as
∀P (P (x)↔ P (y))→ x = y,
where P is a variable that ranges over the set of the attributes of x and y, we
must understand the quantifier ∀ as classical logic does (since we are supposing
the valitity of classical logic by hyphotesis). That is, ‘forall’ means for all, and
not for some. This seems quite trivial, but without such a remark we cannot
justify the restrictions of the range P to monadic properties only, or to relational
properties only, or to spatio-temporal properties, as in (French and Redhead,
1988). In all these cases, it has not been assumed PII in full, since the range of
P was restricted. The possibility of admiting that there are various forms of PII
sustains our belief that there is no reason to suppose that some kind of attribute,
say relational properties, are not ‘licit’.
Roughly speaking, every formula of an adequate language with just one free
variable should stand for a ‘property’. By this way, even the ‘problematic’ prop-
erty Ia of an object a defined by Ia(x)↔ x = a must count as licit. The problem
regarding Ia is that if it is included in the class of a’s attributes, then every object
b which share with a all its properties (that is, every object indistinguishable from
a) is so that Ia(b) and hence it is identical with a. By this reason, it has been
argued that Ia is not a legitime property of a. Here, we do not need to make ad
hoc restrictions on the set of possible properties of an elementary particle, since
in quasi-set theory the lack of identity of some objects makes sense the fact that
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even a ‘property’ like Ia(x) should be considered as licit from the syntactical point
of view. Nevertheless, it cannot be adequately attributed to a since the concept of
identity (represented here by the sign of equality) does not make sense for objects
of the a-type. Important to note that this ‘restriction’ results from a very natural
way of considering particles, instead of a prejudice on the properties, and follows
Scho¨dinger’s ideas (da Costa and Krause, 1994). More details on this point can
be found in (Krause, 199*b).
Another point is that in considering quantum objects as devoided of well-
defined identity, as quasi-set theory does, there remains the problem of explicating
how a macroscopic body, which is composed by these entities, acquires its identity.
Schro¨dinger (1952) expressed that in terms of a Gestalt , but of course we have
a great problem in our hands. An interesting analysis of Schro¨dinger’s ideas is
presented in (Bitbol and Darrigol, 1992). We envisage that perhaps what is in
need is a kind of ‘quantum mereology’, that is, a logic of part-whole (Simons,
1987) suitable for quantum physics. Our suppositions here do not depend on this
topic, which is also related with interesting points as, for instance, Gibb’s paradox
(Lesk, 1980). These topics will be pursued in future works.
2. OUTLINES OF THE THEORY Q
The quasi-set theory Q is based on Zermelo-Fraenkel-like axioms and allows
the presence of two sorts of atoms (Urelemente), termed m-atoms andM -atoms.6
Concerning the m-atoms, a weaker ‘relation of indistinguishability’ (denoted by
the symbol ≡), is used instead of identity, and it is postulated that ≡ has the
properties of an equivalence relation. The predicate of equality cannot be applied
to the m-atoms, since no expression of the form x = y is a formula if x or y
denote m-atoms. Hence, there is a precise sense in saying that m-atoms can be
indistinguishable without being identical. This justifies what we said above about
the ‘lack of identity’ to some objects.
The universe of Q is composed by m-atoms, M -atoms and quasi-sets (qsets,
for short). The axiomatics is adapted from that of ZFU (Zermelo-Fraenkel with
Urelemente), and when we restrict the theory to the case which does not consider
m-atoms, quasi-set theory is essentially equivalent to ZFU, and the corresponding
quasi-sets can then be termed ‘ZFU-sets’ (similarly, if also the M -atoms are ruled
out, the theory collapses into ZFC). TheM -atoms play the role of the Urelemente
in the sense of ZFU.
In order to preserve the concept of identity for the ‘well-behaved’ objects, an
Extensional Equality is introduced for those entities which are not m-atoms on
the following grounds: for all x and y, if they are not m-atoms, then
x =E y := ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y) ∨ (M(x) ∧M(y) ∧ x ≡ y)
It is possible to prove that =E has all the properties of classical identity and so
these properties hold regardingM -atoms and ‘sets’ (see below). In this paper, all
references to ‘=’ stand for ‘=E’, and similarly ‘≤’ and ‘≥’ stand, respectively, for
6All the details of this section may be found in (Krause, 199*a).
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‘≤E ’ and ‘≥E ’. Among the specific axioms of Q, few of them deserve explanation.
The other axioms are adpted from ZFU.
For instance, to form certain elementary quasi-sets, such as those contan-
ing ‘two’ objects, we cannot use something like the usual ‘pair axiom’, since its
standard formulation pressuposes identity; we use the weak relation of indistin-
guishability instead:
[The ‘Weak-Pair’ Axiom] For all x and y, there exists a quasi-set whose elements
are the indistinguishable objects from either x or y. In symbols,7
∀x∀y∃Qz∀t(t ∈ z ↔ t ≡ x ∨ t ≡ y)
Such a quasi-set is denoted by [x, y] and, when x ≡ y, we have [x] by definition.
We remark that this quasi-set cannot be regarded as the ‘singleton’ of x, since
its elements are all the objects indistinguishable from x, so its ‘cardinality’ (see
below) may be greater than 1. A concept of strong singleton, which plays an
important role in the applications of quasi-set theory, may be defined, as we shall
mention below.
In Q we also assume a Separation Schema, which intuitivelly says that from
a quasi-set x and a formula α(t), we obtain a sub-quasi-set of x denoted by
[t ∈ x : α(t)].
We use the standard notation with ‘{’ and ‘}’ instead of ‘[’ and ‘]’ only in the
case where the quasi-set is a set .
It is intuitive that the concept of function cannot also be defined in the stan-
dard way, so we introduce a weaker concept of quasi-function, which maps col-
lections of indistinguishable objects into collections of indistinguishable objects;
when there are no m-atoms involved, the concept is reduced to that of function as
usually understood. Relations, however, can be defined in the usual way, although
no order relation can be defined on a quasi-set of indistinguishable m-atoms, since
partial and total orders require antisymmetry, which cannot be stated without
identity. Asymmetry also cannot be supposed, for if x ≡ y, then for every rela-
tion R such that 〈x, y〉 ∈ R, it follows that 〈x, y〉 =E [[x]] =E 〈y, x〉 ∈ R, by force
of the axioms of Q.8
It is possible to define a translation from the language of ZFU into the language
of Q in such a way that we can obtain a ‘copy’ of ZFU in Q. In this copy, all the
usual mathematical concepts (like those of cardinal, ordinal, etc.) can be defined;
the ‘sets’ (in reality, the ‘Q-sets’ which are ‘copies’ of the ZFU-sets) turn out to
be those quasi-sets whose transitive closure (this concept is like the usual one)
does not contain m-atoms.
Although some authors like Weyl (1949) sustain that (in what regard cardinals
and ordinals) “the concept of ordinal is the primary one”, quantum mechanics
seems to present strong arguments for questioning this thesis, and the idea of
presenting collections which have a cardinal but not an ordinal is one of the most
basic pressupositions of quasi-set theory.
7In all that follows, ∃Q and ∀Q are the quantifiers relativized to quasi-sets.
8We remark that [[x]] is the same (=E) as 〈x, x〉 by the Kuratowski’s definition.
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The concept of quasi-cardinal is taken as primitive in Q, subject to certain
axioms that permit us to operate with quasi-cardinals in a similar way to that
of cardinals in standard set theories. Among the axioms for quasi-cardinality, we
mention those below, but first we recall that in Q, qc(x) stands for the ‘quasi-
cardinal’ of the quasi-set x, while Z(x) says that x is a set (in Q). Furthermore,
Cd(x) and card(x) mean ‘x is a cardinal’ and ‘the cardinal of x’ respectively,
defined as usual in the ‘copy’ of ZFU we can define in Q.
[Quasi-cardinality] Every qset has an unique quasi-cardinal which is a cardinal
(as defined in the ‘ZFU-part’ of the theory) and, if the quasi-set is in particular
a set, then this quasi-cardinal is its cardinal stricto sensu:9
∀Qx∃Q!y(Cd(y) ∧ y =E qc(x) ∧ (Z(x)→ y =E card(x)))
Q still encompasses an axiom which says that if the quasi-cardinal of a quasi-
set x is α, then for every quasi-cardinal β ≤ α, there is a subquasi-set of x whose
quasi-cardinal is β, where the concept of subquasi-set is like the usual one. In
symbols,
[The quasi-cardinals of subquasi-sets ]
∀Qx(qc(x) =E α→ ∀β(β ≤E α→ ∃Qy(y ⊆ x ∧ qc(y) =E β))
Another axiom states that
[The quasi-cardinal of the power quasi-set ]
∀Qx(qc(P(x)) =E 2qc(x))
where 2qc(x) has its usual meaning.
As remarked above, in Q there may exist qsets whose elements are m-atoms
only, called ‘pure’ qsets. Furthermore, it may be the case that the m-atoms of
a pure qset x are indistinguishable from one another, in the sense of sharing the
indistinguishability relation ≡. In this case, the axiomatics provides the grounds
for saying that nothing in the theory can distinguish among the elements of x.
But, in this case, one could ask what it is that sustains the idea that there is
more than one entity in x. The answer is obtained through the above mentioned
axioms (among others, of course). Since the quasi-cardinal of the power qset of x
has quasi-cardinal 2qc(x), then if qc(x) = α, for every quasi-cardinal β ≤ α there
exists a subquasi-set y ⊆ x such that qc(y) = β, according to the axiom about
the quasi-cardinality of the subquasi-sets. Thus, if qc(x) = α 6= 0, the axiomatics
does not forbid the existence of α subquasi-sets of x which can be regarded as
‘singletons’.
Of course the theory cannot prove that these ‘unitary’ subquasi-sets (suppos-
ing now that qc(x) ≥ 2) are distinct, since we have no way of ‘identifying’ their
9Then, every quasi-cardinal is a cardinal and the above expression ‘there is a unique’ makes
sense. Furthermore, from the fact that ∅ is a set, it follows that its quasi-cardinal is 0.
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elements, but qset theory is compatible with this idea.10 In other words, it is
consistent with Q to maintain that x has α elements, which may be regarded
as absolutely indistinguishable objects. Since the elements of x may share the
relation ≡, they may be further understood as belonging to a same ‘equivalence
class’ (for instance, being indistinguishable electrons) but in such a way that we
cannot assert either that they are identical or that they are distinct from one
another (i.e., they act as ‘identical electrons’ in the physicist’s jargon).11
We define x and y as similar qsets (in symbols, Sim(x, y)) if the elements
of one of them are indistinguishable from the elements of the another, that is,
Sim(x, y) if and only if ∀z∀t(z ∈ x ∧ t ∈ y → z ≡ t). Furthermore, x and y
are Q-Similar (QSim(x, y)) if and only if they are similar and have the same
quasi-cardinality. Then, since the quotient qset x/≡ may be regarded as a collec-
tion of equivalence classes of indistinguishable objects, then the ‘weak’ axiom of
extensionality is:
[Weak Extensionality]
∀Qx∀Qy(∀z(z ∈ x/≡ → ∃t(t ∈ y/≡ ∧ QSim(z, t)) ∧ ∀t(t ∈ y/≡ →
∃z(z ∈ x/≡ ∧ QSim(t, z))))→ x ≡ y)
In other words, the axiom says that those qsets that have ‘the same quantity
of elements of the same sort12 are indistinguishable.
Finally, let us remark that quasi-set theory is equiconsistent with standard
set theories (like ZFC) (see (da Costa and Krause, 199*; Krause, 1995; Krause,
199*a)).
2.1 THE QUASI-SET THEORETICAL VERSION OF THE INDIS-
TINGUISHABILITY POSTULATE
As we mentioned in the Introduction, the Indistinguishability Postulate intu-
itively says that permutations of indistinguishable elementary particles cannot be
regarded as observable. In order to provide an interpretation of this fact in Q, let
us introduce the following definition:
Definition 1 A strong singleton of an object x is a qset x′ which satisfies the
following property:
x′ ⊆ [x] ∧ qc(x′) =E 1.
We usually denote the strong singleton x′ of x as St(x).
Thus, according to the above definition, x′ is a subquasi-set of [x] (the col-
lection of all objects indistinguishable from x) that has just ‘one element’. This
10The differences among such ‘unitary’ qsets may perhaps be obtained from a distinction
between ‘intensions’ and ‘extensions’ of concepts like ‘electron’. By this way we engage our
approach into what Dalla-Chiara and Toraldo di Francia (1993) termed the “world of intensions”.
11The application of this formalism to the concept of non-individual quantum particles has
been proposed in (Krause and French, 1995).
12In the sense that they belong to the same equivalence class of indistinguishable objects.
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definition makes sense since the quasi-cardinals are cardinals, as entailed by the
‘Quasicardinality’ axiom. Furthermore, it is straightforward to prove in Q that
for every x there exists a strong singleton of x (Krause, 199*a).
Then, by recalling further that the qset operations of difference, intersection
and union acquire intuitive meanings as in the standard set theories, we can state
the following theorem:
Theorem 1 [The Indistinguishability Postulate] Let x be a qset and z an m-atom
such that z ∈ x. If w ≡ z, then
(x − z′) ∪ w′ ≡ x
The proof is an immediate consequence of (mainly) the axiom of Weak Ex-
tensionality. By recalling that z′ (respect., w′) denotes the strong singleton of z
(respect., of w), then when w /∈ x we may interpret the theorem as saying that
we have ‘exchanged’ an element of x by an indistinguishable one, and that the
resulting fact is that ‘nothing has occurred at all’ (the resulting qsets are indis-
tinguishable). In other words, an indistinguishable from z was exchanged by an
indistinguishable from w (provided that z and w are indistinguishable), and noth-
ing occurred with x at all (the remaining quasi-set is indistinguishable fromthe
original one).
3. QUASI-SET-THEORETICAL PREDICATE FOR QUANTUM PAR-
TICLES
In this section, we define a quasi-set-theoretical predicate for quantum particle
systems.13 In order to deduce, e.g., the quantum statistics, we need to precise the
concept of a microobject being in a certain ‘state’. That is not an easy task, and
we shall try to do it as closer to ‘physicists intuition’ as we can.
Definition 2 A structure Qbf = 〈P,P , F, S,R〉 is a quantum particle system if
and only if the following axioms are satisfied (we shall use x, y, z as variables
ranging over P and p, q, r as variables ranging over P):
Q1 P is a finite quasi-set.
Q2 ∀x(x ∈ P → m(x)).
Q3 ∀p(p ∈ P → p ⊆ P ).
Q4 ∀x(x ∈ P ∧ F (x)→ m(x) ∧ ∀y(y ≡ x→ F (y))).
Definition 3 B(x) =def m(x) ∧ ¬F (x)
13This constitutes an extension of Suppes’ (1957, 1967) research program which sets as a
slogan that to axiomatize a theory is to define a set-theoretical predicate.
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In other words, F is an unary predicate such that F (x) intuitivelly says that x is a
‘fermion’. If x obeys the predicate B, we say that x is a ‘boson’. Then, definition
3 states that any microobject which is not a fermion is a boson, but of course we
could modify it conveniently in order to allow also the consideration of other kind
of microobjects such as paraparticles (Green, 1953; Hartle and Taylor, 1969).
Q5 S is a set endowed with an order relation. The elements of S are called
‘quantum states’. The elements of S will be denoted by s, s1, s2, . . ..
Q6 R is a quasi-relation with domain P and counter-domain S, that is, R =
[[p, s] : p ∈ P , s ∈ S].
Q7
⋃
p∈P = P .
Q8 ∀p∀s([p, s] ∈ R→ ∀q(qc(q) > qc(p)→ [q, s] 6∈ R)).
Q9 ∀p∀s∀q∀t([p, s] ∈ R ∧ [q, t] ∈ R ∧ s 6= t→ p ∩ q = ∅).
Q10 ∀x∀p∀s(p ∈ P ∧ x ∈ p ∧ s ∈ S ∧ F (x) → ([p, s] ∈ R → qc(p) ≤ 1)) (Pauli’s
Principle).
Axiom Q1 says that we are considering a finite number of particles only.
Axiom Q2 says that we are concerned only with microobjects, that is, P is a pure
quasi-set. Axiom Q3 says that the elements of P are sub-quasi-sets of P . Axiom
Q4 says that every fermion is a microobject and that any object indistinguishable
from a fermion is also a fermion. Axiom Q5 says that we can order quantum
states. Axiom Q6 says that R is a relation whose first elements are sub-quasi-sets
of P and whose second elements are quantum states; we can say more about the
physical interpretation of R. If [p, s] belongs to R and qc(p) = n, then we can
say that ‘the quantum state s has occupation number equals to n’, that is, ‘there
are n quantum particles in the state s’. Axiom Q7 says that every particle of
the domain belongs to one of the elements of the choosen collection P . Axiom
Q8 says that the first elements of the pairs in R have the ‘maximal number’ of
elements. Axiom Q9 guarantees that one particle cannot be simultaneously in
two different quantum states. Axiom Q10 is our quasi-set theoretical version of
Pauli’s Exclusion Principle. The relation R provides a way of labelling certain
collections of elementary particles. We do not discuss the way of doing this here,
since it is outside of our logico-mathematical objectives. One possible way of
doing that is by the procedure pointed out in our previous work (Sant’Anna and
Krause, 1997). But axiom Q10 says that the quasi-cardinalities of colections of
fermions associated to the same state by R cannot be greater than 1.
From our definitions, we have the following results, among others (the proofs
are immediate):
Theorem 2 Any object indistinguishable from a boson is also a boson.
Theorem 3 Every microobject is either a fermion or a boson.
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In our quasi-set-theoretical framework, the electronic structure of, e.g., the
sodium atom (Na) is something like the following. Suppose that P , the collection
of particles, corresponds to the collection of all electrons in an Na-atom. So, it is
a pure quasi-set such that qc(P ) = 11. Let us consider also that the set of states
is S = {s1, s2, s3, . . . , s12}. If the quasi-relation R is defined as
R = [[p1, s1], [p2, s2], [p3, s3], ..., [p10, s10], [p11, s11], [p12, s12]] (1)
where pi ∈ P (i = 1, ..., 12) are collections of elements of P , and such that
qc(p1) = ... = q(p11) = 1, while qc(p12) = 0. Thus it results that:
1. The quasi-sets p1, ..., p11 are similar (cf. section 2);
2. For i, j = 1...11, pi ≡ pj . That is, pi and pj are indistinguishable in the
sense of the Weak Extensionality Axiom;
3. From the collection of the subsets of S, we may define (perhaps by physical
means) the set
E = {{s1, s2}, {s3, s4}, {s5, s6, s7, s8, s9, s10}, {s11, s12}} (2)
where each element of E, which for the purposes below we shall name Si,
i = 1, . . . , 4, corresponds to an energy level in the sodium atom. The element
{s5, s6, s7, s8, s9, s10} ∈ E should correspond to the energy level 2p, which
allows 6 electrons, once each si, i = 5, ..., 10, is associated to a qset with
just 1 electron (a strong singleton). The element {s11, s12} coresponds to
the energy level 3s which allows two electrons but ‘has’ just one electron
(recall that qc(s11) = 1 and qc(s12) = 0). The other two elements of E,
namely, {s1, s2} and {s3, s4}, correspond respectively to the energy levels
1s and 2s. Then quations (1) and (2) induce the quasi-relation
R = [[p1 ∪ p2, {s1, s2}] , [p3 ∪ p4, {s3, s4}] ,
[p5 ∪ . . . ∪ p10, {s5, . . . , s10}] , [p11 ∪ p12, {s11, s12}]] (3)
where qc(p1 ∪ p2) =E qc(p3 ∪ p4) =E 2, qc(p5 ∪ . . .∪ p10) =E 6 and qc(p11 ∪
p12) =E 1. The quasi-relation R is the quasi-set-theoretical version for the
usual rule 1s22s22p63s1.
We observe that this way of seeing the sodium atom is quite ‘natural’ since no
identification of the electrons in P is made. The manner to associate each pi to
its ‘state’ in S depends on the so-called ‘elements of definition’. In other words,
we have taken that R is a quasi-relation with counter-domain S (which is a set);
mathematically, S aims to provide a way of individualizing the collections. From
the ‘physical’ point of view, we may recall that the states are of course not mere
collections of particles. As remarked, for instance, by Schro¨dinger (1992), there
is a fundamental distinction between ‘a certain model’ (we may say, a certain
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‘quasi-set’ pi) and ‘a certain state of this model’ (the ‘pair’ [pi, si]). We could
interpret a state s as an ordered pair 〈exs, ins〉, where exs is the extension of the
concept ‘state’, and ins is its intension; the extension of smay me regarded simply
as the collection of objects (elementary particles, in the intended interpretation)
which are in that state. The intension of s may then be interpreted as the state’s
‘elements of definition’, if we use Schro¨dinger’s (1992) terminology, that is, it is
the conjunction of the physical properties that characterize the state. The above
manner to interpret the quasi-relation R is also strongly connected with the ideas
presented in (Dalla-Chiara and Toraldo di Francia, 1993), where it was advanced
that ‘microphysics is a world of intensions’; but we shall leave the details of this
point to a future work.
4. QUANTUM STATISTICS
In this section we show how to explain the quantum distribution functions in
our axiomatic framework. In order to see the differences between our approach
by using quasi-sets and the ‘classical’ one, let us begin by giving an example.
Suppose that we have two indistinguishable particles labelled 1 and 2 dis-
tributed among two distinct states, specified by orthogonal wave-functions ξ1
and ξ2. First of all, let us remark that the use of labels does not compromisse us
with any individuation of the particles, for it is precisely whether these labels have
meaning in the sense of ascribing individuation to the particles that is questioned
here (French, 1989); we intend precisely to show how these labels are dispens-
able in our formal approach. Redhead and Teller (1991, 1992) and Teller (1995)
sustain that it is precisely this consideration of labels that causes inconvenients
in first quantization, since there results ‘surplus structures’ which can be defined
in the formalism but that have no counterpart in the physical world. Then they
propose to use the second quantized approach, mainly the Fock space formalism,
but it was pointed out that even in this case we are not completely free from (at
least) conceptual labels (French, Krause and Maidens, 199*).
But leaving aside these more philosophical questions, let us assume the suppo-
sition above, which is closer to the day-to-day manner we consider the quantum
mechanical machinery. So, Bose-Einstein statistics permits the following arrange-
ments:
••
••
• •
whereas Fermi-Dirac statistics allows only
• •
Then, due to the indistinguishability of the particles, the corresponding vectors
for the first three cases are chosen to be respectively
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|ξ11〉 ⊗ |ξ12〉)
|ξ12〉 ⊗ |ξ11〉)
1√
2
(|ξ11〉 ⊗ |ξ22〉+ |ξ12〉 ⊗ |ξ21〉
while for the fourth case, by force of the Pauli’s Principle, we choose
1√
2
(|ξ11〉 ⊗ |ξ22〉 − |ξ12〉 ⊗ |ξ21〉.
We have used the word ‘choose’ above to mark the presence of the Indistin-
guishability Postulate (IP) here. The labels, initially attached to the particles,
are ‘forgotten’ by an adequate selection of states which considers symmetry: any
permutation of labels is not regarded as originating a distinct state at all. Even
in the anti-symmetrical case this may be asserted, since the expectation value of
the state after a permutation is exactly the same of the state before permutation
of the labels, as it is well known.
In our approach, we deal with collections (quasi-sets) of objects, and not with
vectors in an adequate space (which seems more in conformity with the intuitive
way of reasoning by means of the boxes above).
In order to obtain the quantum distribution functions we have considered two
assumptions in our axiomatics: First, S is a finite set; that is a necessary hy-
pothesis in the sense that we are interested only in collections of microobjects
associated to energy levels of a limited interval of energy. These energy levels
may correspond to, in a plausible interpretation, different quantum states. It is
quite obvious, therefore, that we are not considering the case of particles under
the influence of some kind of non-vanishing potential, like electrons of an atom,
for example, since, in this case, different states may correspond to the same energy
level. The second assumption is that P is a quasi-set with either only indistin-
guishable fermions or only indistinguishable bosons.
By using the terminology of section 3, let us suppose that we have defined
a quasi-relation R as equation (1) above, that is, R = [[p, s] : p ∈ P , s ∈ S].
In other words, we are considering a certain collection P of elementary particles
subjected to certain states, whose collection we call S. Then, for a particular
physical situation, we suppose that we are able to select a family E = {Si}i∈H
of subsets of S such that
⋂
i∈H Si = ∅, where H = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} (which bring
us to a situation mathematically similar to equation (2) above). Each Si may be
called an energy bin (or macrostate), while each element s ∈ Si may be called an
energy state (or microstate). The choice of a particular Si (which is generally done
by physical criteria) particularizes the collections of particles to certain states of
interest, namely, the states that belong to the selected set Si. To this particular
situation i, let us suppose that we are considering qc(P ) = νi particles, and that
qc(Si) = ki. Then we can define the quasi-relation R|i = [[p, s] : p ∈ P , s ∈ Si].
Such relation R|i intuitively describes a particular distribution of the νi par-
ticles into the states in Si. So, if we intend to answer the fundamental question:
‘How many ways Ii may we correspond (or distribute) νi indistinguishable bosons
(recall that qc(P )|i = νi) in the ki quantum states s of each Si (qc(Si) = ki)?’
then, since a correspondence between bosons and quantum states is given by the
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quasi-relations R|i, and taking into account that we are talking about bosons,
which are not subject to axiom Q10, the answer is precisely the quantity of
quasi-relations R|i that can be performed.
Let us explain this result by considering an example. Suppose that we have
νi = 5 indistinguishable bosons to be distributed among 3 distinct cells (states)
s1, s2 and s3. That is, qc(Si) = 3. Since collections of such bosons with the same
quasi-cardinality are indistinguishable in the sense of the Weak Extensionality
Axiom, we shall refer to them by their quasi-cardinalities only. Thus, there are
21 different manners of distributing 5 indistinguishable bosons into the states s1,
s2 and s3, that is, there are 21 possible quasi-relations R|ji , j = 1, . . . , 21 which
can be defined for this particular situation i. In the present example, these quasi-
relations are shown in the table below, where the integer number entries stand for
the quasi-cardinality of the qsets p1, p2 and p3 associated to each si; the numbers
1, . . . , 21 name the relations R|1i to R|21i :
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
s1 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
s2 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 5
s3 0 0 1 2 1 0 3 2 1 0 4 3 2 1 0 5 4 3 2 1 0
For instance, at the column numbered 3 we have the quasi-relation
R|3i = [[p1, s1], [p2, s2], [p3, s3]]
where qc(p1) = 4, qc(p2) = 0 and qc(p3) = 1.
Then, the number of ways to distribute νi indistinguishable bosons in the ki
quantum states s is 21, a number which is usually obtained by Einstein’s equation:
Iibosons =
(ki + νi − 1)!
(ki − 1)!νi! . (4)
So, Einstein’s equation expresses the manner to calculate the number of pos-
sible relations R|i that can be performed in each situation i.14 In the same way,
if we repeat our calculations for fermions, since they are subject to axiom Q10
(there can be no more than one fermion for each quantum state s ∈ S), the answer
will be:
Iifermions =
ki!
(ki − νi)!νi! . (5)
An important remark is that usually equations (3) and (4) are obtained by
considering that different quantum states correspond to distinct energy levels
(Garrod, 1995). Our calculations are more general in the sense that we may have
different quantum states at the same energy level as in the case of the sodium
atom considered above. In the case of the interpreting quantum states as energy
14It is only a simple calculation to prove this result, since the numbers involved in the formula
are quasi-cardinals of certain qsets.
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levels, we could consider, for example, that S is an energy interval given by [0, kT ],
where k is the Boltzmann constant and T = 300K, while each Si corresponds to
an energy range of about 10−33J (there are 1012 Si’s), and each Si has 1019
quantum states s.
The total number of microstates corresponding to a given macrostate (energy
bin) is then given by:
Ibosons(fermions) =
∏
i
Iibosons(fermions) (6)
Since classical mathematics can be obtained within the scope of quasi-set
theory, all the calculations that follow the derivation of the statistics can be
performed here as usual. The most probable macrostate will be determined by
maximizing log I − αN − βE, where α and β are Lagrange parameters that have
been introduced to take into account the restriction to fix the total particle number
N , total energy E, and log is the natural logarithm. Thus, it seems clear that we
need to define an injective function f : S → E , where E is an interval of positive
real numbers. Intuitivelly, E corresponds to energy.
In the case of fermions we should maximize the following function F :
F = log
(∏
i
ki!
(ki − νi)!νi!
)
− α
∑
i
νi − β
∑
i
νiεi =
∑
i
[ki(log ki − 1)− (ki − νi)(log(ki − νi)− 1)
−νi(log νi − 1)− ανi − βεiνi] , (7)
where εi stands for the energy associated for each Si. It is clear from these cal-
culations that we have used Stirling’s approximation, which states that logK! ≈
K(logK − 1) for K ≫ 1. Nevertheless, such an approximation was used just for
bin occupation numbers νi and not for the state ocupation numbers.
Setting
∂F
∂νi
= 0, (8)
we get
log[(ki − νi)/νi] = α+ βεi, (9)
which gives
νi =
ki
eα+βεi + 1
. (10)
If we assume that the energy differences of the states in the i-th bin are neg-
ligible, then according to equation (10), the average occupation of any individual
state in that bin is
νi
ki
=
1
eα+βεi + 1
. (11)
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Finally, the average ocupation number of the n-th single-particle state of en-
ergy εn is given by the well-known Fermi-Dirac distribution function:
ffermions =
1
eα+βεn + 1
. (12)
For bosons, the calculations are very similar, and we have the Bose-Einstein
distribution function:
fbosons =
1
eα+βεn − 1 . (13)
The physical interpretation of the parameters α and β is the usual one. β =
1/kT , where k is Boltzmann constant and T is the absolute temperature. α is a
normalization constant usually refered to as affinity.
5. THE HELIUM ATOM
The helium atom is probably the simplest realistic situation where the problem
of individuality plays an important role. With the identity question put aside,
the wave function of the helium atom would be just the product of two hydrogen
atom wave functions with Z = 1 changed to Z = 2. Nevertheless, the space part
of the wave function for the case where one of the electrons is in the ground state
(100) and the other one is in excited state (nlm) is:
φ(x1,x2) =
1√
2
[ψ100(x1)ψnlm(x2)± ψ100(x2)ψnlm(x1)], (14)
where the + (−) sign is for the spin singlet (triplet)15 and x1 and x2 are the
vector positions of both electrons.
For the ground state, however, the space function must be necessarily symmet-
ric. In this case, the problems regarding identity have no physical effect. The most
interesting case is certainly the excited state. Equation (14) reflects our ignorance
on which electron is in position x1 and which one is in position x2. Neverthe-
less, in the same equation there are terms like ψ100(x1), which corresponds to a
specific physical property of an individual electron.
Our quasi-set theoretical interpretation for equation (14) is as follows (it re-
sembles the case of the sodium atom already discussed above). Let P be a pure
quasi-set such that qc(P ) = 2. We intuitivelly interpret the elements of P as elec-
trons of the Helium atom. If G is a unary predicate such that G(x) intuitively says
that ‘x is in the ground state’ (the definition of G depends on physical aspects),
then, by using the separation axiom of Q, we obtain the sub-quasi-set p1 ⊆ P
defined by
p1 = [x ∈ P : G(x)].
15Spin singlet refers to total spin zero and spin triplet refers to total spin different of zero.
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If we call p2 = P − p1, then qc(p1) = qc(p2) = 1. So, the elements of p,
despite their indistinguishability, are ‘separated’ by their ‘respective states’. More
formally, by calling g1 the ground state and g2 the anther state, we may define
R = [[p1, g1], [p2, g2]]. (15)
It is clear that g1 and g2 may be interpreted respectivelly as 100 and nlm as
above. So, we have arrived to a manner to express the fact that between two
objects (the elements of P ) there is one of them in the ground state, although we
cannot identify which one, since the qsets p1 and p2 are indistinguishable (in the
sense of the Weak Extensionality Axiom). In other words, equation (15) stands
for the situation presented in equation (14). R is a quasi-function, but we still
need to show how it evolves in time, that is, we need to explain the sense according
to which equation (15) plays the role of the wave function given in equation 14.
Such a topic will be discussed in another paper.
6. FINAL REMARKS AND FURTHER PROBLEMS
1. As we mentioned in the Introduction, in a previous work it was presented
a manner to cope with collections of ‘physically’ indistinguishable particles
in a set-theoretical framework by using hidden variables (Sant’Anna and
Krause, 1997). In that paper, such hidden variables were interpreted as
‘inner properties’ which may have no physical interpretation untill now.
But, by adapting a kind of realistic point of view, we might say that their
meaning is to be achieved by future physics, where perhaps one will be
able to distinguish among (at the moment) indistinguishable particles. If
we understand that quasi-set theory reflects the idea that individuality is
somehow ‘veiled’ for elementary particles, it seems reasonable to make an
analogy with the treatment given in terms of hidden variables.
2. According to Hall (1986) it cannot be said that chemistry has been reduced
to quantum mechanics since Pauli’s exclusion principle cannot be derived
from quantum mechanics. Scerri (1995) does not agree with Hall. It is well
known that questions regarding reductionism cannot be precisely stated if
we do not adopt a set-like-theoretical framework for the physical or chemical
theories in question. Reductionism can be defined in terms of isomorphisms,
for example (for details see (Suppes, 1967)). On the other hand, we let here
as an open problem if it is possible to derive the exclusion principle from an
axiomatic framework which is similar to that one presented in this paper.
Although we recognise that physicists are generally not concerned with this
topic, we agree with Scerri when he says that “it would be desirable to have
a theory which could explain why only anti-symmetric wavefunctions apply
to fermions” [op. cit.].
3. It is usually considered that the interference produced by two light beams
is determined by both their mutual coherence and the indistinguishability
of the quantum particle paths. The discussion in this paper is focused only
on the ‘corpuscular’ features of quantum particles, in the sense that we are
not dealing with coherence. Mandel (1991) has proposed a quantitative
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link between the wave and the particle descriptions by using an adequate
decomposition of the density operator. We let such a relation between quasi-
sets and coherence as an open problem for future works.
4. It is well known that the unique difference between the electron and the
negative muon is their rest mass (Gell-Mann, 1959). That has motivated
Dirac (1962) to propose a model for the electron in terms of a membrane so
that the muon may be viewed as an electron in an excited ‘state’. There are
two important points about this idea. First, if an electron is a membrane,
then it may be individualized in some sense. This point is in agreement
with the present paper so as with (Sant’Anna and Krause, 1997) (see item
1 of this section). The second point is a bit more critical. If the muon
is an excited electron, it would be possible, by using Schro¨dinger’s (1953)
terminology, to paint electrons, at least in principle. In other words, it would
be possible to mark or individualize electrons by exchanging their intrinsic
properties, mainly for those cases where there are just two electrons.
5. As remarked above, this paper is the first one of a series which intends to de-
rive quantum physics into the formalism of quasi-set theory. In this manner,
we are walking on the road envised by Yu. Manin (1976) when he proposed
that we should search for axioms for collections of indistinguishable objects
like elementary particles. Quasi-set theory does this job, and the possibility
of obtaining such an alternative way of expressing quantum theory seems to
be more in conformity with the possibility that quantum particles are really
indistinguishable objects.
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